Introduction
Social Security is arguably the most successful federal program in U.S. history. The program has substantially reduced senior poverty, enabled millions of older Americans to live independently, and provided vital support to families who have lost income because a loved one died or became too ill or injured to work. With rising life expectancy and the shift away from traditional pension plans, Social Security's inflation-protected lifelong benefits are likely to become increasingly important for old-age economic security in the decades ahead.
Despite Social Security's successes, the program could do more to improve the financial health of older Americans by facilitating the delayed claiming of benefits. For individuals who are between the ages of 62 and 70, monthly Social Security benefits increase by about 7 to 8% for each 1-year delay in claiming, holding work history constant. This increase is reflected in higher monthly benefits over the life of the beneficiary. Monthly benefits may increase further, to the extent that delayed claiming leads to longer working lives. Delayed claiming can also result in higher benefits for surviving spouses.
In this paper, we propose Supplemental Transition Accounts for Retirement (STARTs) to serve as a bridge to receiving Social Security benefits. STARTs would be mandatory add-on savings accounts funded by employees, employers, and a progressive government contribution. STARTs would be fully integrated into the Social Security program. Every individual with a START would be required to exhaust that account's assets before receiving retired worker benefits, or age-based spousal or survivor benefits (special rules would apply to workers receiving disability benefits). For many people, STARTs would serve to raise the age at which Social Security benefits would first be paid. Thus, our proposal would reduce the total actuarial reduction or increase the delayed retirement credits that would apply, resulting in higher monthly benefits over the life of the beneficiary.
The Urban Institute, using its Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM), estimated that by 2065 this innovation would increase per capita net cash income, on average, by 4.4-6.7% for people aged 62 and older (with the median increase between 8.2 and 10.3%). The range reflects different assumptions about whether participants and their employers would reduce other retirement plan contributions in response to STARTs. People aged 62 and older in the lowest lifetime earnings quintile would see the biggest percentage increase in income (on average, about 10%, with a median increase of about 15%) and the highest lifetime earnings quintile would see the smallest increase (on average, 1.7-4.9%, with the median increase between 2.5 and 6.1%). Those increases in income would be achieved while reducing Social Security's 75-year actuarial deficit by about 12%, based on the Urban Institute's modeling assumptions, which used data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report.
Importantly, this innovation would increase monthly benefits without affecting beneficiaries' expected actuarial lifetime Social Security benefits or limiting their access to essential income at early retirement ages. This proposal builds on Social Security's comparative advantage to mitigate the key factors that undermine economic security at older ages: longevity risk, market risk, and inflation risk.
Adequacy of Social Security Benefits
Researchers have long recognized the role Social Security benefits play in a secure retirement (for a summary of research in this area, see Burkhauser, Gustman, Laitner, Mitchell, & Sonnega, 2009) . Social Security retirement benefits provide income security for tens of millions of Americans. In 2014, 85% of married couples and 84% of nonmarried people aged 65 or older received Social Security benefits. About 61% of all aged households (65 or older) receiving Social Security rely on it for 50% or more of their income, and 33% rely on Social Security for 90% or more of their income (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2016a). An aged household is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person, which also includes persons who are separated or married but not living together. A married couple's household age is defined as the age of the husband if he is 65 or older; if the husband is younger than 55 and the wife is age 65 or older, the age of the household is the age of the wife.
Not surprisingly, reliance on Social Security benefits increases with age. Research using the Current Population Survey shows that whereas 33% of people aged 65 to 69 rely on Social Security for 50% or more of their family income, that number climbs to almost 56% for those ages 80 and above (Shelton, 2016) . Social Security was never designed to be the only source of income people would receive in retirement; for an average worker, Social Security replaces about 40% of annual preretirement earnings, with additional income coming from an employer-provided pension and personal savings. Social Security's full retirement age (FRA), currently 66 years and 2 months, is in the process of rising from age 65 and will reach age 67 for people born in 1960 or later. With that increase, the total actuarial reductions for claiming Social Security benefits early at a given age are increasing, and the program's replacement rates are falling. That is, raising the full retirement age results in a reduction in annual and lifetime benefits of about a 6 to 7% decrease for each 1-year increase in the FRA. Over the period that the FRA is increasing, average longevity is also expected to rise. Increases in average longevity result in greater lifetime benefits, holding annual benefits constant. The actuarial reductions are designed so that lifetime benefits, on average, are roughly the same regardless of the age at which a person claims benefits. The total reduction, however, often results in a monthly benefit that is inadequate, especially for those who live to or beyond the average life expectancy. Raising the FRA further-a possible component of any future Social Security reform effort-will only make a bad situation worse for many by increasing the actuarial reductions and, therefore, further reducing the monthly benefit amount received relative to current law if claiming Social Security retirement benefits early.
Excluding disability conversions at FRA, roughly 1 in 2 new beneficiaries who first claimed retirement benefits in 2014 were age 62, the earliest eligibility age. More than two thirds were younger than the FRA (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2016b). One way to increase the adequacy of Social Security benefits (and income for rising life spans) is by having people delay claiming retirement benefits. For individuals who are between ages 62 and 70, monthly Social Security benefits increase by about 7 to 8% for each 1-year delay in claiming (see Table 1 ).
For example, consider someone who turns age 62 in 2022 and whose current full retirement age is 67. Assume that person would be eligible for a $1,300 monthly benefit at the FRA. Delaying claiming until age 70 results in a 24% higher monthly benefit, or $1,612 per month, whereas Because Social Security benefits act as inflation-protected annuities, those who delay claiming are essentially purchasing an additional inflation-protected annuity benefit. In the private sector, companies that sell annuities generally adjust their payouts and make them less generous when life spans increase or when interest rates decrease, in order to maintain the lifetime value of annuity payouts. In contrast, Social Security does not adjust monthly benefits this way: its benefit formula and age adjustments are fixed by law. As longevity increases, on average, and interest rates fall, the lifetime value of benefits for any given claim age increases as well. This also means that if life spans continue to increase and the economy continues to exhibit a sustained period of low interest rates, then delaying the initial Social Security claim will become more financially valuable over time. The START program would encourage individuals to take advantage of this provision.
Further, the continued movement away from definedbenefit plans to defined-contribution plans, by both private-and public-sector employers, has shifted much of the burden and risk of paying for retirement onto the individual, increasing the relative importance of monthly Social Security benefits in retirement.
Barriers to Workers Delaying Social Security Retirement Benefits
Research published by AARP's Public Policy Institute used the Health and Retirement Study to analyze those who claimed Social Security benefits at age 62 and those who claimed later. Those claiming benefits at age 62 were found to have lower earnings, be less educated, were more likely to work in physically-demanding jobs, and, importantly, were likely to be less healthy (Li, Hurd, & Loughran, 2008) . According to the research, 1 in 5 (19%) early claimers reported they had a work-limiting condition at the time of claiming early Social Security retirement benefits.
Research published by the University of Michigan Retirement Research Center found evidence that those with physically-demanding jobs face many challenges and barriers to extending their working careers (Neumark & Song, 2012) . Further, workers who develop cognitive impairments in their later working years may face significant barriers to working throughout their 60s. A Boston Retirement Research Center report, referencing data by the Alzheimer's Association, stated that "over half the cases of mild impairment progress to dementia, which erodes all cognitive functions irreversibly." (Belbase & Sanzenbacher, 2016, p.4) Although the incidence of Alzheimer's disease (the most common type of dementia) in people's 50s and early 60s is low-less than 4% of people under age 65-it rises to 15% of 65-to 74-year-olds (Belbase & Sanzenbacher, 2016) .
Additional research by the Boston College Retirement Research Center noted that the bottom third of the income distribution-those who tend to have lower employment skills and higher levels of unemployment as they approach retirement-face significant barriers to working later in life and extending work past the normal retirement age. "The bottom line is that working longer may not be realistic or desirable for all members of society, and this possibility merits careful consideration when it comes to reforming the U.S. retirement income system" (Munnell, Sanzenbacher, & Sass, 2009, p. 4) The retirement landscape is changing, and the likely reality is that people will need to save more and work longer, either retiring later or working for pay during retirement. Any barrier to extending one's working career will likely create additional financial stress on the ability to save for and have enough financial resources in retirement. Retirement policy reforms that increase the ability of workers to delay claiming Social Security benefits, thereby mitigating the effects of actuarial reductions for claiming early and potentially allowing workers to gain additional monthly Social Security benefits through the delayed retirement credits, would increase the financial security of millions of Americans in retirement.
Solution: Supplemental Transition Accounts for Retirement
The goal of STARTs is to allow a delay in claiming of Social Security benefits for about 2 to 3 years from the date the worker would have otherwise claimed benefits. This delay would increase monthly Social Security benefits by between 14 and 25%, depending on the original claim age. Importantly, we would achieve an increase in monthly Social Security benefits without limiting access to essential income at early retirement ages.
In essence, the proposal would increase the early eligibility age for Social Security retired worker benefits, spousal benefits, and widow(er) benefits to mitigate the impact of actuarial reductions and to increase monthly benefits, which would help future retirees finance consumption over an increasing life span. But by the proposal's design, the increase in the early eligibility age would be flexible, depending on the amount of assets a person had in his or her START.
Our proposal would also help workers receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), whose benefits are not subject to actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits. Although our proposed rules governing STARTs are generally similar for SSDI beneficiaries as for other beneficiaries, there are some important differences. First, we would adjust the benefits of an SSDI beneficiary up by an actuarially fair factor to reflect the time period that START assets would be used instead of SSDI trust fund assets. Second, we would allow an SSDI beneficiary with a severe medical condition that met any of the conditions set forth in the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) Compassionate Allowances program to take a lump-sum distribution from her START regardless of age (for a full listing of the SSA's compassionate allowances conditions, see U.S. Social Security Administration, 2018). The proposed special rules for SSDI beneficiaries are discussed in more detail below.
STARTs would differ from other mandatory private savings account proposals in some important ways. First, our proposal would not require that assets in the START be used to purchase a private-sector annuity. Rather, our proposal would use the START assets implicitly to purchase additional inflation-protected annuitized income through the Social Security program. As noted above, the annuities provided by higher Social Security benefits are superior to those offered by the private sector in several ways. Second, we would not reduce Social Security benefits for money distributed from the account. Our focus was on improving benefit adequacy for rising life spans, not on solvency, although our proposal does modestly reduce the long-term funding shortfall in Social Security. Policymakers should make changes to Social Security to address the program's 75-year financing deficit. We believe, however, that any adjustment to Social Security benefits to achieve solvency should not be related to START assets, so as not to reduce public support for START or to penalize those with higher START assets.
Funding
START contributions would be required for all workers with taxable earnings covered under Social Security who had not reached their FRA. Required contributions would not apply to earnings beginning on January 1 in the year the worker achieved the FRA. We would not impose a minimum age requirement, so as to enable younger workers to take full advantage of compounding of interest and earnings.
Both workers and employers would contribute 1% of earnings (2% combined), up to the annual maximum for Social Security payroll taxes ($127,500 in 2017) , to the worker's START. A self-employed individual would make required contributions as both employer and employee. Contributions made on earnings in excess of the taxable maximum ($127,500 in 2017) would be treated in the same way as Social Security payroll taxes. The employee portion of the overpayment would be refunded to workers through their tax returns. The employer portion would not be refunded, and this amount would be credited to the Social Security trust funds.
The SSA would enroll all Social Security-covered workers in START. START contributions would be collected in the same way and under the same schedule as payroll taxes. In the case of an employee, the worker's employer would forward the employer and employee contributions with other payroll taxes. Self-employed workers would also submit START contributions with their payroll taxes. This typically occurs through quarterly estimated tax payments and is reconciled on the tax return.
The tax character of START contributions would be the same as Social Security payroll taxes. Employer contributions are pretax, whereas worker contributions are aftertax. The self-employed would be allowed to deduct half of their START contributions from taxable income, identical to the way the self-employed treat payroll taxes today.
The federal government would contribute to the STARTs of low-income workers. The maximum government contribution would be 1% of earnings for married couples filing jointly with an adjusted gross income (AGI) less than $40,000, single filers with an AGI less than $20,000, and head of household filers with an AGI less than $30,000. The government contribution would be phased out over an AGI range of $10,000, $7,500, and $5,000 for joint, head of household, and single filers, respectively. For example, the government contributions for joint filers with AGIs of $42,500 would be 0.75% and with AGIs of $45,000 would be 0.5%. Workers in low-income households would receive a total START contribution of up to 3% of their earnings. The government contribution would be treated like an employer contribution and would not be included in current taxable income.
The progressive government contribution would be needed to replicate the progressive structure of the Social Security benefit formula. As shown in Table 2 , Social Security replaces a higher percentage of career-average earnings of low lifetime earners than of high lifetime earners. Because distributions from START assets would equal the Social Security benefits that would have otherwise been paid, lower earners would need higher START assets as a percentage of their earnings than would higher earners to "buy" an equivalent amount of delay. For example, low-earning workers who turned 62 in 2022 would need START assets equal to 40.7% of their career average earnings to "buy" 1 year of delay, compared with START assets of 30.2% of career average earnings for medium earners. ($11,922) 56.1% Low earnings ($21,459) 40.7% Medium earnings ($47,687) 30.2% High earnings ($76,299) 25.0% Steady max earnings ($116,123) 19.8%
Note: Source: Social Security Administration, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ NOTES/ran9/an2016-9.pdf
For married couples, total contributions (employer, employee, and government) to each spouse's START would be split equally between the spouses based on the married couple's combined earnings (what we refer to as deposit splitting). Deposit splitting would occur regardless of whether the spouse had Social Security-taxable earnings. We took this approach because women are more likely than men to have years without earnings, often as a result of caregiving responsibilities. Further, the additional annuitized income that comes from delayed claiming is particularly important for women, who on average live longer than men and rely on Social Security for a higher percentage of income. Finally, this approach would make administering the accounts easier because there would be no need to split the assets at divorce or retirement. However, this approach would mean that spouses working in uncovered employment would have contributions made to a START in their name.
Distributions
Our proposal requires START assets to be distributed and exhausted before an individual could receive Social Security benefits that are subject to actuarial reductions, if claimed before the FRA. Social Security benefits that meet these conditions would include retired worker benefits and spousal benefits of a retired or disabled worker, which a person can claim as early as age 62, and survivor benefits of an aged widow or widower, which a person can claim as early as age 60.
An individual could elect to first receive START benefits at the earliest age of eligibility, but would not be required to do so. The amount that any individual could withdraw in a given year would be limited to the Social Security benefit payable under today's Social Security rules. The annual cost-of-living-adjustment applicable to Social Security benefits would also apply to START benefits once distributions from the accounts began. If a worker did not qualify for Social Security, he or she would still have access to START assets without restriction, beginning at age 62.
Social Security benefits would begin once beneficiaries exhausted their START assets or reached the FRA and elected to stop receiving START distributions. The Social Security benefit would be subject to actuarial reductions and delayed retirement credits, if applicable, as under current law. Individuals could access START assets without restrictions and without any effect on Social Security benefits, beginning at the FRA and until age 70; this would include taking the full amount of START assets as a lumpsum distribution. At age 70, beneficiaries would be required to liquidate the accounts either by taking a full lump-sum distribution, or rolling the assets into a qualified plan, individual retirement account, or a beneficiary's START.
Consider the example of someone whose FRA was 67 but who decided to claim benefits at age 62. If her monthly benefit at FRA would be $1,300, her monthly benefit at age 62 would be $910. Under our proposal, the SSA would pay $910 per month, funded from her START assets, beginning at age 62. Once the SSA distributed all of the START assets, it would begin paying Social Security benefits. If the START assets were sufficient to cover just 2 years of delayed claiming, the SSA would pay this beneficiary $1,040 per month in Social Security benefits, or a benefit that is 14% higher.
Any START assets remaining at the time of the account owner's death would go to her designated beneficiaries. These assets could be transferred to the beneficiary's START or paid directly as a lump-sum distribution. A lump-sum distribution would be included in the beneficiary's taxable income. Assets transferred to a START, however, would become taxable only when the beneficiary began taking distributions. The tax character of START assets (pretax and after-tax) would transfer from the original account holder to the beneficiary.
START distributions would be treated like Social Security income for eligibility and benefit amounts under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program: that is, these distributions are included as unearned income for SSI determination but excluded from the SSI asset test. The SSI is a federal means-tested program that provides cash assistance to people with little or no income who are aged 65 and older, are blind, or have a disability.
Special Rules for Workers Who Qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance
Social Security disability benefits are not subject to actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits, so workers who become disabled get no benefit from a delay in claiming. Nonetheless, our goal for START is to increase economic security at older ages for all workers through the Social Security system. Consistent with this goal, we would apply similar START rules to SSDI beneficiaries as those that would apply to retired workers, with two important exceptions. First, we discuss the similarities.
Like retired workers, SSDI beneficiaries would have unrestricted access to their START assets beginning at their FRA. Also like retired workers, SSDI beneficiaries who applied for and received disability benefits between ages 62 and the FRA would be required to first exhaust their START assets before receiving Social Security payments from the SSDI trust fund. We took this approach to ensure that our proposal would not change the relative value of claiming disability benefits compared to retired worker benefits between ages 62 and FRA (for a detailed discussion, see Fichtner & Seligman, 2016, p. 140) .
After a beneficiary exhausted her START assets or reached FRA and elected to stop receiving START distributions, the SSA would begin paying monthly benefits that reflected actuarially fair credits for the time the beneficiary received START assets instead of Social Security. The SSA would need to determine the actuarially fair credit, which would provide that benefits paid over the life of the beneficiary, on average, were about the same regardless of whether a person's SSDI benefits had been suspended and temporarily replaced with START assets. For purposes of modeling the distributional effects of this proposal, we asked the Urban Institute to use the delayed retirement credit-that is, two-thirds of 1% for each month delay, or 8% annually-to adjust SSDI benefits.
Because of the unique circumstances of workers with a disability, we would allow them greater flexibility in accessing their START assets than we would retired workers. First, an SSDI beneficiary who had a condition on the Compassionate Allowance list would have unrestricted access to his START assets, regardless of age. The SSA's compassionate allowance program identifies diseases and serious medical conditions that clearly meet Social Security's definition of a disability, and allows for an expedited approval process. The SSA adds new conditions to the list annually. We took this approach to balance the need for financial resources that often accompanies a serious disability against the underlying goal of our proposal to improve financial security at older ages. Second, SSDI beneficiaries who were in pay status when they turned 62 could elect to use their START assets to "purchase" additional Social Security annuity income, but they would not be required to do so.
Consider the example of a beneficiary who first received SSDI at age 59, equal to $1,000 per month. Let's assume $24,000 in START assets at age 62. Beginning at age 62, the beneficiary could elect to receive the $1,000 monthly payment from START assets instead of Social Security. The START assets would replace 2 years of SSDI payments. Beginning at age 64, this person would receive SSDI benefits again, but the payment after adjusting for inflation would be $1,160, or 16% higher, to reflect the actuarially fair credit (for this example, we used the delayed retirement credits).
Account Structure and Administrative Considerations
STARTs would be professionally managed in a pooled account with an emphasis on keeping administrative fees as low as possible. An independent board would serve as the fiduciary. The board would select the private investment firm(s) responsible for managing START assets and set the investment guidelines for the pooled assets. The board could choose to distribute participant's assets across multiple fund managers to mitigate against the risk that participants' asset returns will vary by fund manager. Individuals would not be allowed to select investments.
We expect the investment guidelines to structure the accounts at the participant level like target date funds. The independent board would set the glide path to manage longevity and market risks, as well as provide guidance on allocations across and within investment classes. The board could elect to use the Federal Thrift Savings Plan target date funds as a model. For purposes of the dynamic simulations discussed below, we used the Thrift Savings Plan's target date funds as the investment for START assets.
Because STARTs would be integrated with Social Security, the SSA could take advantage of existing systems and benefit from economies of scale in administrating these accounts (for a full discussion of administrative and record-keeping issues associated with individual accounts related to Social Security, see Whitman, 2006) . The SSA's tasks would include maintaining account records-including tracking individual account balances and transactions-communicating with participants, and answering their questions. More generally, the SSA would be responsible for educating participants about how STARTs work and how they interact with the Social Security program. We recognize that this would be a significant undertaking for the SSA, and the agency would require additional funding to carry out these new responsibilities; such costs could ultimately be funded by a small administrative fee on the START assets.
Tax Treatment of START Distributions
Distributions from STARTs, including amounts rolled into a qualified plan or Individual Retirement Account, would be included in taxable income to the extent they represent pretax contributions and earnings. Revenue from taxing START distributions would be credited to the Social Security trust funds, and would be more than adequate to cover the 75-year cost of the government contributions.
Discussion and Overview of the DYNASIM Analysis
This section provides a discussion and highlights results from DYNASIM, the Urban Institute's dynamic microsimulation model. The model projects income and assets through the year 2087 by age, gender, race and ethnicity, income, earnings, education, and a number of other characteristics. DYNASIM is well suited to model the projected changes in income and assets from START, which would be highly dependent on the asset value of the accounts at older ages, which would take many years to build.
The Urban Institute ran four sets of START simulations that reflect two assumptions regarding benefit levels (scheduled benefits and payable benefits) and two assumptions on the effect of START on participants' and employers' contributions to employer-provided defined-contribution plans (no offset and dollar-for-dollar offset). The scheduled benefit baseline assumed that current-law Social Security benefits would continue to be paid in full even after the Social Security trust funds were exhausted. The payable benefits baseline assumed that once the Social Security trust funds were exhausted, the amount payable would be limited to current revenue coming into the system (mainly via payroll taxes). The two sets of assumptions regarding benefit levels and offsets to other saving were intended to represent extremes, so that the four scenarios bound the range of plausible outcomes.
Each simulation projected the distributional effects of START for the years 2025, 2035, 2045, 2055, and 2065 . The Urban Institute did not model any change in labor force participation.
Below, we detail the effects of our proposal on poverty and income. First, we make some general observations from the simulations. STARTs would raise the income of the lowest lifetime earners the most. Mean and median increases in net per capita cash income for this group would be about 10 and 15%, respectively, in 2065. Not surprisingly, the effect would increase substantially over time as the accounts received more contributions and the assets grew.
The proposal would be fully funded by employee and employer contributions and by crediting the Social Security trust funds with the revenue from taxing START distributions. The last item would more than offset the cost of the government contributions, thereby reducing Social Security's 75-year actuarial deficit by about 12%, based on the Urban Institute's modeling assumptions' use of data from the 2015 Social Security Trustees Report. The overall average increase in net per capita income would depend on whether workers reduced their other retirement saving in response to START contributions. However, the different overall results would be driven by higher-income households, that are much more likely than lower-income households to be making contributions to an existing retirement plan. The change in average income for low-income households and overall poverty rates would be almost identical under the assumptions regarding saving behavior.
According to the Urban Institute's modeling, STARTs would have smaller poverty reductions and income raises for people aged 80 and older than for those aged 70 to 79. This is a transition issue: older participants in 2065 would have had fewer years to accumulate assets in STARTs. 
Poverty
START would reduce poverty significantly for people aged 62 and over (see Figure 1) . The reduction would be due to the increased monthly Social Security benefit people would receive from a delay in claiming.
Under the scheduled benefit scenario, STARTs would reduce poverty for people aged 62 and over from 7.4% to 7% in 2045, and from 5.6% to 5% in 2065.
STARTs would reduce poverty by even more under the payable benefits scenario. For people aged 62 and over, poverty would fall from 10.4% to 9% in 2045 and from 8.1% to 6.3% in 2065. Focusing on estimates for 2065 under the scheduled benefit scenario, STARTs would reduce poverty rates in all age groups of 62 and over, all racial categories, and all marital status categories (see Figure 2 ).
Income
STARTs would raise net per capita cash income considerably among people aged 62 and over. The Urban Institute's measure of net per capita cash income includes earnings, Social Security, defined-benefit pensions, interest, dividends, rental income, retirement account withdrawals, Supplemental Security Income, and other means-tested and non-means-tested benefits, less federal income tax, state income tax, Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes, Medicare surtax, and Medicare Part B and Part D premiums. Assuming employees and employers reduced contributions to employer-provided retirement saving accounts by the amount of START contributions (full offset), average household income in 2065 would still rise in each quintile, with the lowest lifetime earnings quintile exhibiting the greatest proportional increase, of 9.7% (see Figure 3a) . The proportionally bigger anticipated increase in income for low lifetime earners likely reflects their greater reliance on Social Security income. Higher earners are more likely to have other sources of retirement income than Social Security, so a 10% increase in that group's Social Security benefits, for example, would represent a smaller percentage increase in net cash income than it would for low earners, whose only source of income might be Social Security. Figure 3b shows similar data as Figure 3a , but here we assumed that there was no reduction in private saving as a result of START contributions. Under this assumption, the percentage change in average net cash income would be higher for all quintiles than under the full-offset assumption shown in Figure 3a .
Average net cash income would also rise for households in each marital category for those aged 62 and over. Figure 4a presents the results assuming a full dollar-fordollar offset and Figure 4b assumed no offset.
Figures 5a (offset) and 5b (no offset) provide similar results by age category for those aged 62 and over. START would raise average net per capita cash income the most for people aged 70 to 79 (almost 7% with full offset and about 11% with no offset). The projected increases for those age groups represent the most accurate picture of the full potential of our proposal on economic security at older ages. As mentioned earlier, people aged 80 and over in 2065 would have less than a full career of START contributions and asset accumulation. Further, many individuals aged 62 to 69 are projected to receive smaller START benefits compared with the adjusted Social Security benefits they would receive. Figure 6 shows the anticipated effects of our proposal on people aged 70 to 79 in 2065 by shared lifetime earnings quintile under the full-offset assumption. Those results show the projected average impact of our proposal after eliminating, to the extent possible, the cohort and transition effects mentioned in the paragraph above. At all lifetime shared earnings quintiles, the average increase in income would be substantially larger (50% or more) for those aged 70 to 79 compared with people aged 62 and older. For example, the average increase in net income for people in the lowest lifetime earnings quintile would rise from about 10% for those aged 62+ to almost 15% for those aged 70 to 79. At the middle lifetime earnings quintile, average income would increase from about 6 to 10% for people aged 62+ compared with those aged 70 to 79.
The anticipated increase in cash income as a result of STARTs would be a significant improvement in the retirement security of older Americans. would displace contributions to employer-provided retirement savings plans. The Urban Institute's projections show that women and men would experience similar increases in income under our proposal, but there would be notable differences by education and race/ethnicity. For example, Blacks and Hispanics would have larger percentage increases in cash income than would Whites, on average, but smaller dollar increases. The average percentage increase in cash income would fall as educational attainment rose.
Labor Force Participation
This proposal has the potential to increase retirement security more broadly by encouraging work, for two main reasons. First, START benefits would not be subject to the retirement earnings test. The retirement earnings test is a widely-misunderstood feature of the Social Security program that most beneficiaries view as a pure tax (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). As a result, researchers have found some evidence that it discourages work (Engelhardt & Kumar, 2014) . Second, the proposal could provide additional incentives for working longer, through its unrestricted access to START assets at the FRA, including a lump-sum distribution. Although this could have a positive effect on the labor supply of workers who otherwise would have left the labor force prior to the FRA, it could encourage people who otherwise would have left employment after the FRA to leave sooner.
In a separate study, the Urban Institute estimated that for each additional year of work, annual consumption in retirement increases by 9%. And the benefits to working longer are larger for lower-income households. One additional year of work could increase annual consumption at retirement for the bottom lifetime earnings quintile and the second quintile by 16 and 12%, respectively (Butrica, Smith, & Steuerle, 2006) . Working longer not only means higher Social Security benefits, but also increased retirement savings and fewer years of retirement that have to be covered by those savings. Longer working lives also improve the financial position of the Social Security program, because the additional work increases payroll taxes.
Conclusion
The retirement landscape has evolved over the past few decades. A movement away from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans by both private-and public-sector employers has shifted much of the burden and risk of paying for retirement onto the individual.
Financial security in retirement is still obtainable. However, the likely reality is people will need to save more on their own and work longer, either retiring later or working for income during retirement. Social Security's inflation-protected annuity feature could help millions of Americans achieve a more financially secure retirement by facilitating later claiming of Social Security benefits to maximize the inflation-protected annuity value that Social Security provides.
Supplemental Transition Accounts for Retirement would provide the necessary bridge and allow individuals to delay claiming Social Security benefits. This, in turn, would mitigate the effects of actuarial reductions for claiming early and potentially allow workers to gain delayed retirement credits. The result would be higher monthly Social Security benefits and income-on average, about 5 to 7% overall, and 10% for the lowest earning workers-that could not be outlived or eroded by inflation.
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